Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1986

Alma E. Peck v. Eimco Process Equipment Co.,
Second Injury Fund and Industrial Commission of
Utah, : Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Roger D. Sandack; Giauque and Williams; Attorney for Appellant.
Robert Finch, Erie Boorman, Ralph L. Finlayson; Attorneys for Respondent.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Peck v. Eimco Process Equipment Co., No. 198620914.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1986).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/1431

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

nfcfr

ALMA E. PECK, pjO^ i*/
Petitioner,
Case No. 20914

vs.
EIMCO PROCESS EQUIPMENT CO.,
SECOND INJURY FUND and
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH,
Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
EIMCO PROCESS EQUIPMENT CO.

Writ of Review from
Industrial Commission of Utah

GIAUQUE & WILLIAMS
Roger D. Sandack
500 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorney for Alma E. Peck

ROBERT R. FINCH
4322 Vallejo Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124
Attorney for Eimco Process
Equipment Co.
ERIE BOORMAN, Administrator
Second Injury Fund
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
RALPH L. FINLAYSON
Office of the Attorney General
State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
Attorney for Industrial
Commission of

APR 181986
Clork, Supr9me Court, Utab

JN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ALMA E. PECK,
Petitioner,
vs.

Case No. 20914

EIMCO PROCESS EQUIPMENT CO.,
SECOND INJURY FUND and
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH,
Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
EIMCO PROCESS EQUIPMENT CO.

Writ of Review from
Industrial Commission of Utah

GIAUQUE & WILLIAMS
Roger D. Sandack
500 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorney for Alma E. Peck

ROBERT R. FINCH
4322 Vallejo Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124
Attorney for Eimco Process
Equipment Co.
ERIE BOORMAN, Administrator
Second Injury Fund
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
RALPH L. FINLAYSON
Office of the Attorney General
State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
Attorney for Industrial
Commission of Utah

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1

STATEMENT OF FACTS

1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

2

ARGUMENT
I.

II.

III.

IV.
CONCLUSION

Applicant is not permanently totally
disabled and is not entitled to benefits
under U.C.A., 1953 Section 35-1-67

2

The decision in Marshall v. The
Industrial Commission 681 P2d 208
(Utah 1984) does not mandate a
a finding for applicant

8

The findings and Order of the Industrial Commission
reversing the Administrative Law Judge
are not "arbitrary and capricious",
"wholly without cause", "contrary to the
one (inevitable) conclusion from the
evidence", or "without any substantial
evidence to support them."
10
The Industrial Commission of Utah did not
commit any error of law.

14
18

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES
Entwistle v Wilkins
626 P2d 495 Utah 1981

7,

Hollis v Traveler's Insurance Co.
368 So2d 154 (La. App. 1978)

7

Kerans v Industrial Commission of Utah
25 Utah Adv. Rep. 42 (Jan 3 1986)

11

Marshall v Industrial Commission of Utah
681 P2d 208 (Utah 1984)

2,

Metzger v Chemetron-Corp.
687 P2d 1033 (Mont. 1984)

10

Ogden Standard Examiner v Industrial
Commission of Utah
663 P2d 88 (Utah 1983)

11

U.S. Steel v Industrial Commission of Utah
607 P2d 807 (UTAH 1980)

7,

STATUTES
Utah Code Annotated (U.C.A.) 1953
section 35-1-67
SECONDARY AUTHORITIES
2 Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law
Sec. 57.51 and 57.64(b)

7,

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ALMA E. PECK,
Petitioner,
vs.

Case No. 20914

t

EIMCO PROCESS EQUIPMENT CO.,
SECOND INJURY FUND and
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH,

]

,

Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
EIMCO PROCESS EQUIPMENT CO,
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Respondent concurs with the statement as recited
in petitioner's (Applicant's) brief.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent

concurs generally in the Statement of Facts

as recited in the brief of applicant but offers some comments for
clarity.
According to applicant's own testimony (R 156-165) and
the summary by Dr. Noehrens (R 118) applicant has had a wide
variety of work and other experiences.

These include taking

several courses at technical schools, construction work, owning
and operating a farm for about ten years, owning and operating a
blacksmith business for eight to ten years, spending about a year
abroad on a project study, performing a variety of duties while
working forat least twelve years with several employers other
than respondent Eimco, and performing a variety of tasks while

1

working five years and two months with Eimco.
The statements appearing at the top of page 4 of Applicant's brief concerning applicant's "intent" relative to voluntary
retirement or termination may be ambiguous.

The fact is that

applicant retired and does not assert that respondent or anyone
else forced him to retire or terminate involuntarily.
In reversing the Administrative Law Judge the Industrial
Commission, after setting aside the Administrative Law Judge's
interpretation of Marshall v The Industrial Commission/

681 P2d

208 (Utah 1984), based its action on several findings, including
a finding that applicant had not met his burden of showing
inability to work.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

Applicant is not permanently totally disabled and

is not entitled to benefits under U.C.A., 1953

35-1-67.

II. The decision in Marshall v The Industrial
Commission, 681 P2d 208 (Utah 1984) does not mandate a finding
for applicant.
III.

The findings and order of the Industrial Commis-

sion reversing the Administrative Law Judge are not "arbitrary
and capricious", "wholly without cause", "contrary to the one
(inevitable) conclusion from the evidence", or "without any substantial
evidence to support them."
IV.

The Industrial Commission of Utah did not commit

any error of law.
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4322 Vallejo Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124
(801) 278-8184

April 28, 1986
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Peck v Eimco Process
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FILED
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the following citation in the brief of respondent Eimco Process
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The citation pertains particularly to pages 11, 13, and 18 of the
brief of respondent Eimco Process Equipment Company.
Very truly yours,

Enclosure

ROBERT R. FINCH
4322 Vallejo Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124
(801) 278-8184

Attorney At Law

A p r i l 2 8 , 1986

Mr. Geoffrey J. Butler
Clerk of the Court
Supreme Court of Utah
322 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Re:

Supplemental Citation in
Peck v Eimco Process
Equipment Co., et al
Case No. 20914

FILED
APR2 9 1986
Clerk, Supreme Court, Utah

Dear S i r ;
Pursuant to Rule 24, Rules of Appellate Procedure, please enter
the following citation in the brief of respondent Eimco Process
Equipment Co.
Bigfoot's, Inc. v Industrial Commission of Utah,
28 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (02/26/86)
The citation pertains particularly to pages 11, 13, and 18 of the
brief of respondent Eimco Process Equipment Company.
Very truly yours,

>rt R. Finch
Attorney for Eimco
Enclosure
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84124
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Attorney At Law

A p r i l 28, 1986
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Peck v Eimco Process
Equipment Co., et al
Case No. 20914

FILED
£PR2 9 1986
Clerk, Supreme Court, Utah""

Dear S i r :
Pursuant to Rule 24, Rules of Appellate Procedure, please enter
the following citation in the brief of respondent Eimco Process
Equipment Co.
Bigfoot's, Inc. v Industrial Commission of Utah,
28 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (02/26/86)
The citation pertains particularly to pages 11, 13, and 18 of the
brief of respondent Eimco Process Equipment Company.
Very truly yours,

Robert R. Finch
Attorney for Eimco
Enclosure

ROBERT R. FINCH
Attorney At Law
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84124
(801) 278-8184

April 28, 1986

Mr. Geoffrey J. Butler
Clerk of the Court
Supreme Court of Utah
322 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

FILED
APR2 91986
Clerk, Supreme Court, Utah

Re:

Supplemental Citation in
Peck v Eimco Process
Equipment Co., et al
Case No. 20914

Dear Sir:

P u r s u a n t t o Rule 24, Rules of A p p e l l a t e P r o c e d u r e , p l e a s e e n t e r
t h e f o l l o w i n g c i t a t i o n i n t h e b r i e f of r e s p o n d e n t Eimco P r o c e s s
Equipment Co.
B i g f o o t ' s , I n c . v I n d u s t r i a l Commission of Utah,
28 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (02/26/86)
The c i t a t i o n p e r t a i n s p a r t i c u l a r l y t o pages 11, 13, and 18 of the
brief of respondent Eimco Process Equipment Company.
Very t r u l y yours,

Attorney for Eimco
Enclosure

ARGUMENT
I.

PETITIONER IS NOT PERMANENTLY TOTALLY DISABLED
AND IS NOT ENTITLED TO BENEFITS UNDER U.C.A.,
1953, 35-1-67

To qualify for benefits under U.C.A., 1953, 35-1-67,
an applicant must show two things:

That because of industrial

impairment he is disabled from performing the general duties of
his work;

and that he is not a good candidate for rehabilitation.
In the instant case, Rehabilitation Services found

that applicant was not a good candidate for rehabilitation (R
217).

However, this does not establish that applicant is

disabled, only that he would not be a good candidate for
retraining in a new occupation.

A finding that would apply to

many, if not most, people aged sixty-five.
Applicant has failed to establish that he is disabled
from performing the duties of his job. In this connection, the
findings of the Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial
Commission are specific and relevant.

In his Findings, Conclu-

sions and Order (R 218-224), the Administrative Law Judge stated:
"The Applicant

worked

effectively

before the

December 1982 injury despite his 27% pre-existing
impairment which included such things as hearing
loss. The December 1982 incident only added a 10%
impairment.

The Applicant was able to work

effectively in his job for about a year after his
injuries healed.

There is no evidence of a new
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injury, nor is there any medical evidence that the
Applicant was taken off the job April 28, 1984,
because of his old injuries.

The Applicant just

plain retired."(R 222)
The Administrative Law Judge presided at both hearings,
had

all

exhibits,

heard

all

testimony,and

applicant concerning his ability to work.

even

questioned

On one occasion, in

response to questions by the Administrative Law Judge, applicant
admitted that he had never turned down jobs at work.

(R 82)

There was a hearing on October 17, 1983, after applicant had
returned to work and one on September 25, 1984, after he had
retired.

After all of this, the Administrative Law Judge was

still of the opinion that applicant had "just plain retired."
The facts in this case are compelling.

After treatment

and release by the doctor, applicant returned to work and worked
almost a year until voluntary retirement. There were no new
injuries.There are no medical opinions or other medical evicence
that he was totally disabled. There is no medical evidence that
his injuries took him off the job.
that he advised

his

employer

He has made no allegations

on the

job that

his

physical

condition had changed and he could no longer work at what he was
doing.

He just worked until he became 65 and retired the next

day.
The Administrative Law Judge did not at any time make a
specific separate finding based on evidence that applicant was
permanently and totally disabled.

He did not even make a preli-

minary finding of total disability prior to referring applicant
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for rehabilitation evaluation.

(R 216-217) His only finding of

disability was based solely on the so-called 'mandate1.
Dr. Holbrook, head of the medical panel that examined
applicant, declined to state that applicant was disabled, (R 149)
and he made no recommendations against future work.
The Medical Panel Findings are set forth in a report
dated February 1, 1984 by Dr. Boyd G. Holbrook, M.D. (R 179-187)
and are summarized in the Order of The Industrial Commission (R
238-243).

The findings disclose an array of ailments, including

such things as hearing loss (5%), non-industrial cervical spine
degeneration (10%), sore right ankle (rated at 7% of whole man
due primarily to pain) etc.

The medical report itself is over

eight pages long and it refers to reports from other physicians.
Nowhere in the Medical Panel report or related
documents is there any statement that applicant is disabled from
work or can anticipate becoming disabled because of the injury or
otherwise. On page five of the report (R 182), referring to his
discussions with applicant, Dr. Holbrook wrote:
"(5) The low back.

He has made a good recovery from

the low back surgery as indicated at the hearing and in
the medical records. He does still get some numbness
and tingling in the right lower extremity particularly
with lifting or walking for long periods of time. He
has returned to work but is working more as a helper.
He planned on continuing to work beyond age 65 but now
is afraid that he might get hurt because of his lack of
dexerity because of the other problems that he has. He
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c o n t i n u e s t o n o t e some s o r e n e s s in t h e low back as w e l l
as some s t i f f n e s s .

He f e e l s t h a t the condition of the

back i s q u i t e w e l l s t a b i l i z e d a t t h e p r e s e n t r i m e . "
(Emphasis added.)
In the same report the Medical Panel expressed the
specific conclusion that the industrial injury did not aggravate
the pre-existing impaired condition of the applicant (R 186)
So there was a situation where the applicant was
employed and working, but carefully considering whether he would
be comfortable working beyond his sixty-fifth birthday, which was
then about six months away.

He did not even consider ability to

work, but only whether he might get hurt on account of his preexisting impairment.

He did not say he.was disabled or might

suddenly become disabled on his 65th birthday; only that he might
get hurt after he became 65. Also, he did not blame his lack of
dexterity, (the potential cause of injury) on the industrial
injury, but on the pre-existing impairments, may of which were
simply ailments incident to living and aging.
The medical report of February 1, 1984 is based on an
examination of applicant on November 15, 1983, and the then
existing medical records.

There is no medical evidence of any

sort pertaining to applicant's physical condition since the panel
report of February 1, 1984, so there is no medical evidence
available to show why applicant became disabled on the day he
retired—one day after his 65th birthday.
In order to qualify for benefits for permanent total
disability under U.C.A., 1953, Sec. 35-1-67, an applicant must show
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that because of his industrial injury he can no longer perform
work of the same general character he was doing when injured or
any other work which a man of his capabilities may be able to do
or learn to do,

Entwistle v Wilkins, 626 P2d 495 (Utah 1981).

Applicant has not shown by substantial evidence that he is so
disabled.
In cases where applicant relies on pain to show
disability and there is no medical evidence, the burden to show
disability is a heavy one, especially when applicant worked.
Hollis v Travelers Ins. Co. 368 So2d 154 (La. App. 1978); 2
Larson's Workmenfs Compensation Section 57.21.
On the entire record The Industrial Commission made the
specific finding that applicant had not met his burden showing his
inability to return to work. Respondent submits that this is a
proper finding.
As noted above, the Administrative Law Judge did not
actually make a separate finding that applicant was disabled.
However, had he done so, it would make no difference because
there is conflicting evidence here between applicant's testimony
that he is unable to work and the facts that he could and did
work and that there is no medical evidence that he was disabled or
that his condition changed.

Whenever conflicting evidence exists,

The Industrial Commission may disregard the finding of the Administrative Law Judge and make its own findings of fact
Industrial Commission 607 P2d 807 (Utah 1980).
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U.S.Steel v

II.

THE DECISION IN MARSHALL V. INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION 687 P2D 208 UTAH 208 DOES NOT
MANDATE A FINDING FOR APPLICANT

In spite of his own findings and "with great reluctance" the Administrative Law Judge found that, "under present
case holdings", the applicant was totally and
disabled.

permanently

By the words "present case holdings", the Administra-

tive Law Judge was referring to Marshall v Industrial
Commission of Utah, 681 P2d 208 (Utah 1984). He stated his belief
that that case mandated such a finding and that applicant was
accordingly entitled to benefits.

The Administrative Law Judge

was not specific as to what gave rise to the mandate.

It is

probable he was referring to the relative percentage impairment
in the two cases. In Marshall, the defendants denied liability
on the grounds that impairment was only 26% and that was insufficient for a determination of total disability, and that the sole
reason for applicant's retirement was age.

This Court found that

the Industrial Commission was in error in resting its award on
the percentage of impairment and on the fact the applicant was
eligible to retire rather than on his ability to work.
Regardless of why the Administrative Law Judge believed
he was mandated by Marshall, 681 P2d 208, that case differs
markedly from the case at bar.
In Marshall

681 P2d 208, because of the industrial

injury and the recommendation of his doctors, applicant was
prevented from returning to work in the mines where he had been
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employed forty years. At the time of the injury applicant was 67
years old and eligible to retire, but had not done so.
In contrast, in the instant case, applicant was
injured, returned to work, was later surgically treated, returned
to work again and continued to work until he became eligible to
and did in fact retire.

The differences between the instant case

and Marshall 681 P2d 208 are important.

In Marshall, 681 P2d 208

there was no evidence that applicant had any ability to work.
In the instant case, it is clear, applicant was able to work
because he did.

He may not have been as vigorous as in earlier

days, but he could and did work.
Applicant was told by the treating physician to take it
easy.

(R 77) Apparently he did so because he testified that he

couldn't do everything he had previously done. But the fact is he
performed work of the same general character that he performed
prior to his injury.

Applicant's testimony does not establish

that he couldn't work at his old job.

He says only that he

couldn't do everything he wanted to in the way he was used to
doing it and, as he told Dr. Hollbrook, his lack of dexterity is
due to other problems (R 182). As a practical matter, applicant
was describing the effects of aging as it happens to everyone.

It

does not mean a person is totally disabled.
There are other circumstances in this case mitigating
against a finding of permanent total disability.

Applicant was

not the run of the mill one-employer factory worker. He had been
in a lot of jobs and had a lot of experiences as noted in his own
testimony (R 156-165) and the summary by Dr. Hoehren (R 118).
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He

would normally be more adaptable and resourceful on the job.

In

fact, given his experience and background, it is doubtful that
applicant is truly within the odd-lot doctrine.

Or, if he is, he

has a bigger burden, in view of his wide background, to establish
that work is not available before the burden shifts to the
employer.

Metzger v. Chemetron Corp. 687 P2d 1033 (Mont 1984).
Although the Administrative Law Judge awarded applicant

permanent total disability benefits, he did so solely on the
belief that Marshall, 681 P2d 208 mandated such action.
Industrial Commission reversed.

The

The reversal was not solely

because the Administrative Law Judge had misinterpreted Marshall.
Rather, it was because a review of the entire file convinced the
Commission that applicant was not permanently totally disabled.
The Commission said, "Upon review of the file and the Administrative Law Judge's Orders, the Commission is of the opinion that
the case does not warrant an award of permanent total disability
benefits."

The Commission summarized its review of the file,

distinguished the instant case from Marshall 601 P2d 208 and
concluded (R 238) that, "The facts of this case do not show that
the applicant has met his burden in showing inability to return
to work as is required by Utah Code Annotated Section 35-169."(sic)

(R 239)
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III.

THE FINDINGS AND ORDER OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
REVERSING THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE ARE NOT
"ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS", "WHOLLY WITHOUT CAUSE"
"CONTRARY TO THE ONE (INEVITABLE) CONCLUSION FROM
THE EVIDENCE", OR "WITHOUT ANY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
TO SUPPORT THEM."

This

Court

has

a stringent

standard

of

review

in

Industrial Commission cases. This standard was most recently
reiterated in Kerans v The Industrial Commission of Utah,
25 Utah Adv. Rep. 42 (Jan 3 1986) wherein at page 44, citing
Oqden Standard Examiner v Industrial Commission 663 P2d 88 (Utah
1983), this court said:
sion's

findings

are

"(our inquiry is) whether the Commis-

'arbitrary

and

capricious,' or

'wholly

without cause', or contrary to the 'one (inevitable) conclusion
from

the evidence' or without

support them.

'any substantial evidence' to

Only then should the Commission's findings be

displaced."
In Kerans 25 Utah Adv.
were involved.

Rep. 42, several issues

This Court's standard of review was specifically

applied to affirm the Commission's refusal to enter a finding of
permanent total disability which would have entitled applicant to
benefits under U.C.A., 1953, 35-1-67.
46,

In its decision, at page

this Court stated:
"The question of whether plaintiff was totally and
permanently disabled was one of fact to be decided by
the Commision, upon all the evidence in the case.
light of our stringent

11

standard

of review

of

In

such

questions, and in recognition of the facts and the
evidence cited as the basis for the

Commission's

finding, we decline to disturb that finding."
It is submitted that in the instant case, there is no
basis for holding that the Commission's findings are 'arbitrary
and capricious. ' The Commission reviewed the record and reported
on that review (R 238-242).

Except for the finding of total

disability, which the Administrative Law Judge believed was
mandated, the Industrial Commission concurred with most of the
Administrative Law Judge's relevant findings.

Specifically, the

Commission noted that the Applicant went back to work, he did not
leave work because of old or new injuries, but "just plain
retired".

It also made its own finding that the applicant had

not met his burden of inability to return to work.
There is no basis for finding that the Commission's
findings were 'wholly without cause.' The Commission had all the
evidence in the file, including the medical reports discussed
above,

as a basis to conclude that applicant was not permanently

totally disabled.
Furthermore, the Commission's findings are not 'contrary
to the one (inevitable) conclusion from the evidence.'

Clearly

the conclusion sought by applicant is not the only one possible
from the evidence. The fact is that after treatment, applicant
returned to work and worked for almost a year, then retired.
Surely that does not lead only to a conclusion that applicant is
totally disabled!
And, finally, it cannot be said
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that the Commission's

Order and findings are without any substantial evidence to
support them.

The Commission reviewed the same record as did the

Administrative Law Judge.

Except for the allegedly "mandated11

finding of permanent total disability, it did not upset any of
the Administrative Law Judge's findings.

On the contrary, it

essentially made the same findings with respect to applicant's
ability to work and found accordingly that applicant did not prove
that he was permanently and totally disabled.
Applicant has implied on page 4 of his brief that he*
was forced by respondent to retire.
presented to that effect.

No evidence whatsoever was

This is consistent with the finding by

the Industrial Commission that applicant was not disabled but
just retired.

There is ample evidence to show that applicant was

not disabled.

This includes the fact that applicant worked.

It

also includes a lack of medical evidence that he was disabled.
It further includes statements by applicant that he is concerned
about problems other than the industrial injury but was still
thinking about working past 65. (Supra pp 5-6)

In short, there

is ample support for the finding that applicant was not permanently totally disabled.
In view of the foregoing, it is submitted that the
instant case is one in which the Order appealed from should not
be disturbed because it falls clearly within the situation stated
in Kerans 25 Utah Adv. Rep. 42 where at page 46 this Court said:
"The question of whether plaintiff was totally and
permanently disabled was one of fact to be decided by
the Commission, upon all of the evidence in the case.
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In light of our stringent standard of review of such
questions, and in recognition of the facts and the
evidence

cited

as the basis for the Commission's

finding, we declined to disturb that finding."
The Court's decision in Entwistle Co. v Wilkins, Utah
626 P2d 495, is applicable to the instant case.

In Entwistle the

employer and carrier sought reversal of an Order by the
Industrial Commission awarding temporary total compensation for a
period during which the applicant worked for another employer.
The Order was affirmed.

This Court said, at page 498, that in

considering the attack upon the order, it applies the principles
established in such matters and that, "We review the evidence in
the light most favorable to the Commission's findings, and when
there is substantial evidence to support the facts found by the
Commission, its order will not be disturbed."
In the present case, the key finding is that applicant
did not show that he was totally disabled. There is substantial
evidence to support that finding in that, inter alia, applicant
worked almost a year, retired voluntarily, and there is nothing
in any medical report indicating total disability, or for that
matter, any significant disability at all.
IV.

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH DID NOT COMMIT
ANY ERROR OF LAW IN REVERSING THE ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW JUDGE

The Industrial Commission's Order reversing the
Administrative Law Judge and denying Applicant benefits for
permanent total disability under U.C.A., 1953

l

A

35-1-67 is proper,

consistent with and not contrary to law and does not deny
applicant due process of law.
In the instant case the Applicant was injured, was
treated and, after healing, returned to work. He continued to
work until his sixty-fifth birthday, whereupon he retired.

The

evidence shows, and the Administrative Law Judge did not believe
Applicant was disabled from work stating that:
"The Applicant worked effectively before the
December 1982 injury despite his 27% pre-existing
impairment which included such things as hearing
loss.

The December 1982 incident only added a 10%

impairment.

The Applicant was able to work effectively

in his job for about a year after his injuries healed.
There is no evidence of a new injury, nor is there any
medical evidence that the Applicant was taken off the
job April 28, 1984, because of his old injuries. The
Applicant just plain retired." (R 222)
Nevertheless, the Administrative Law Judge awarded
Applicant long term disability benefits in the belief that the
ruling of this Court in Marshall 681 P2d 208 mandated such an
award.

The Industrial Commission reversed, finding, inter alia,

that "The facts in this case do not show that the Applicant has
met his burden in showing inability to return to work as is
required by Utah Code Annotated Section 35-1-69 (sic)"
In order to establish a prima facie case for permanent
total disability under the odd-lot doctrine as stated in
Marshall, 681 P2d 208,

the applicant must establish (1) That

because of his i n d u s t r i a l impairment he i s no longer capable of
p e r f o r m i n g t h e g e n e r a l d u t i e s of h i s former work, and (2) That
t h e a p p l i c a n t cannot be r e h a b i l i t a t e d .

Only when t h i s i s done,

does the burden s h i f t to the employer to show t h a t regular work
is available.

As noted supra page 10, when, as here,

applicant's

background shows a capacity for doing a v a r i e t y of t a s k s , he has
t o show more than i f he was of l i m i t e d e x p e r i e n c e .

He may have

to demonstrate f i r s t t h a t there i s no work a v a i l a b l e before the
burden s h i f t s .

Metzger v Chemetron 687 P2d 1033 (Mont. 1984)

(Supra page 10).
In the i n s t a n t case, the second element i s e s t a b l i s h e d .
However, a p p l i c a n t has not met h i s burden of proof on t h e

first

element because he did not prove by s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e t h a t
b e c a u s e of h i s

industrial

impairment

he i s

incapable

of

performing the general d u t i e s of h i s former work.
There i s a n o t h e r f a c t o r .

Assuming arguendo t h a t a

prima facie case was made, respondent employer has in fact
met i t s r e s u l t i n g burden because i t had made employment
a v a i l a b l e which a p p l i c a n t was a b l e t o and did perform u n t i l he
voluntarily terminated.

In 2 L a r s o n ' s Workmen's Compensation,

S e c t i o n 57.51, i t i s s a i d t h a t proof of work o f t e n becomes a
c e n t r a l i s s u e t o which t h e r e i s no s i m p l e y e s - o r - n o answer.
It

is

submitted

the facts

of t h i s

c a s e say t h e work was

a v a i l a b l e because a p p l i c a n t had a job he did perform.
Respondent

disagrees

with a p p l i c a n t ' s statement

t h e Commission r e v e r s e d t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Law Judge
because of h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n
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that

solely

of M a r s h a l l 681 P2d 208.

The

Commission held that the Administrative Law Judge was not
"mandated" by the Marshall case to hold as he did.

Then, in

addition, the Commission distinguished the Marshall case and
found further, that the applicant had not met his burden of
showing inability to return to work (R 239).
Respondent

does not claim that an employee is forever

barred from benefits under U.C.A., 1953, 35-1-67 simply because
he returns to work.

Respondent does, however, assert that whether

or not the employee ever returns to work, he must establish
that he is permanently and totally disabled to be eligible for
benefits under U.C.A., 1953, 35-1-67.
applicant has not done so.

In the case at bar,

His return to work and long term

continuation at work, plus all the other factors including the
extensive medical report which do not contain support for

a

claim of disability, are convincing that applicant was not
totally disabled.

The Commission made a specific finding that

applicant had no shown he was disabled.
The Industrial Commission had before it the entire
record of the case.

This included all medical records of the

case, correspondence, exhibits, and testimony.
has a duty to decide questions of fact.
evidence.

The Commission

It does so on all the

It must determine the weight, credibility and meaning

of the evidence in light of all the circumstances.

There is no

showing at all that the Commission ignored any evidence.
There is conflicting evidence here. Applicant wants us
to believe he is totally disabled, but the medical records
contain no real support for that, and he did work for a long
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time.

Perhaps not doing everything,

there is conflicting

evidence,

but working.

When, a s h e r e ,

t h e C o m m i s s i o n may d i s r e g a r d

f i n d i n g of t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Law J u d g e and make i t s own
of f a c t .

U.S.Steel

v. I n d u s t r i a l

the

findings

C o m m i s s i o n 607 P2d 807

(Utah

1980).
It

is submitted that because the applicant

failed

d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t he was p e r m a n e n t l y d i s a b l e d from h i s
w a s no b u r d e n on r e s p o n d e n t ,

but even if

job,

to

there

t h e r e was, i t has been

met.
From t h e f o r e g o i n g

it

is believed aplparent,

there

b e e n no d e n i a l of due p r o c e s s o r o t h e r a c t i o n c o n t r a r y t o

has

law.

CONCLUSION

1.

The a p p l i c a n t

i s not p e r m a n e n t l y and

totally

disabled, and i s not e l i g i b l e for b e n e f i t s under U.C.A., 1953,
35-1-67.
2.

For the reasons r e i t e r a t e d by t h i s Court in Sam

Joe Kerans v The I n d u s t r i a l Commission of Utah, 25 Utah Adv. Rep.
42 (Jan 3, 1986); because t h e f i n d i n g s and Order of t h e I n d u s t r i a l Commission reversing the Administrative Law Judge f s Findings
of

Fact,

Conclusions

capricious,
(inevitable)
substantial

of Law and O r d e r a r e n o t a r b i t r a r y

or wholly w i t h o u t
conclusion

from

cause,
the

or

contrary

evidence,

evidence to support them,

or

but a r e

to

or

the

one

without

any

supported

by

s u b s t a n t i a l evidence and are not i n c o n s i s t e n t with law, the Order of
the I n d u s t r i a l Commission should not be disturbed.
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Wherefore, respondent respectfully requests that the Order
of the Industrial Commission reversing the Administrative Law
Judge be affirmed.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /ft day of April, 1986.

Robert R. Finch
4322 Vallejo Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124
801/278-8184
Attorney for Respondent
Eimco Process Equipment Co.
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placed in the United States mail, postage prepaid, to the

following persons on this
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Ralph L. Finlayson
Office of the Attorney General
State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorney for Industrial Commission of Utah
Erie Boorman, Administrator
Second Injury Fund
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Giauque & Williams
Roger D. Sandack
500 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorney for Applicant

<J^i^ts(
Robert R. Finch

on

